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Abstract Real world networks exhibit rich temporal information: friends are added
and removed over time in online social networks; the seasons dictate the predator-
prey relationship in food webs; and the propagation of a virus depends on the net-
work of human contacts throughout the day. Recent studies have demonstrated that
static network analysis is perhaps unsuitable in the study of real world network
since static paths ignore time order, which, in turn, results in static shortest paths
overestimating available links and underestimating their true corresponding lengths.
Temporal extensions to centrality and efficiency metrics based on temporal shortest
paths have also been proposed. Firstly, we analyse the roles of key individuals of a
corporate network ranked according to temporal centrality within the context of a
bankruptcy scandal; secondly, we present how such temporal metrics can be used
to study the robustness of temporal networks in presence of random errors and in-
telligent attacks; thirdly, we study containment schemes for mobile phone malware
which can spread via short range radio, similar to biological viruses; finally, we
study how the temporal network structure of human interactions can be exploited
to effectively immunise human populations. Through these applications we demon-
strate that temporal metrics provide a more accurate and effective analysis of real-
world networks compared to their static counterparts.
1 Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge 15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FD,
United Kingdom. ·2 Laboratorio sui Sistemi Complessi, Scuola Superiore di Catania,Via Valdis-
avoia 9, 95123 Catania, Italy. ·3 School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, Edgbas-
ton, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom. ·4 School of Mathematical Sciences, Queen Mary,
University of London, E1 4NS, London, United Kingdom. ·5 Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia
and INFN, Universita´ di Catania and INFN, Via S. Sofia 64, 95123 Catania, Italy.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
5.
69
74
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
9 M
ay
 20
13
2 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
1 Introduction
Temporal graph metrics [53, 54] represent a powerful tool for the analysis of real-
world dynamic networks, especially with respect to the aspects for which time plays
a fundamental role, such as in the case of spreading of a piece of information or a
disease. Indeed, existing metrics are not able to characterise the temporal struc-
ture of dynamic networks, for example in terms of centrality of nodes over time.
For these reasons, new metrics have been introduced, such as temporal centrality,
in order to capture the essential characteristics of time-varying graphs. A detailed
description of the metrics used in this chapter can be found in [41].
In this chapter we will discuss a series of possible applications of temporal graph
metrics to the analysis of real-world time-varying networks. This chapter is struc-
tured as follows. We will cover our work in this area and, finally, we will discuss
contributions in this fields by other researchers and potential future applications, in
particular in the area of the modelling of epidemic spreading.
More specifically, in Section 2 we analyse the roles of key individuals according
to temporal centrality within the context of the Enron scandal [54]. In Section we
study how such temporal metrics can used to study the robustness of temporal net-
works in presence of random errors and intelligent attacks [48]. Then, Section 4
we present a containment scheme for mobile phone malware which can spread via
short range radio transmission [52, 51]. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss existing and
potential applications to human epidemiology, outlining some research directions in
these areas.
2 Corporate Networks
2.1 Overview
The Enron Energy Corporation started as a traditional gas and electrical utility sup-
plier; however, in the late 1990s their main money making business came from trad-
ing energy on the global stock markets [19]. In December 2001, the Enron Energy
Corporation filed for bankruptcy after it was uncovered that fraudulent accounting
tricks were used to hide billions of dollars in debt [24]. This led to the eventual
conviction of several current and former Enron executives [56, 8]. The investiga-
tion also brought to light the reliance of the company on traders to bring in profits
using aggressive tactics culminating in intentional blackouts in California in Sum-
mer 2001. With both control over electricity plants and the ability to sell electricity
over the energy markets, Enron traders artificially raised the price of electricity by
shutting down power plants serving the State of California and profiting by selling
electricity back at a premium [7].
During the investigation into the Enron accounting scandal, telephone calls, doc-
uments and emails were subpoenaed by the U.S. government and as such the email
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records of 151 user mailboxes were part of the public record consisting of approx-
imately 250,000 emails sent and received during the period between May 1999 to
June 2002 (1137 days), leading up to the bankruptcy filing. None of the emails were
anonymised and so they provide unique semantic information of the owner of each
mailbox.
2.2 Temporal Graph Construction
In our analysis, we use the dataset prepared by Shetty & Adibi [50]. Since we do
not have a complete picture of the interactions of users outside of the subpoenaed
mailboxes we concentrate on email exchanges between the core 151 users only.
Taking this email dataset, we process the complete temporal graph from 1999 to
2002 with undirected links, using windows of size w=24 hours and horizon h=1.
If an email was exchanged between two individuals in a temporal window, a link
between the two nodes representing those individuals will be added to the graph
representing the temporal snapshot for that time.
2.3 Semantic Value of Temporal Centrality
Figure 1 plots the static and temporal centrality rankings of employees calculated
using closeness and betweenness. Examining the static centralities (left column)
we note that there is little difference between the top five employees using static
closeness or betweenness. Also plotting the static degree centrality of each node1,
we notice similar rankings suggesting that static analysis only favours employees
who interacted with the most number of other people. Temporal closeness and tem-
poral betweenness yield different rankings amongst the top five and the calculated
Kendall-tau correlation coefficient[32] (Table 2) confirm that static-to-static metrics
are strongly correlated (' 0.7). Also note that there is low correlation (< 0.4) be-
tween temporal metrics and static degree demonstrating that temporal analysis is
not dependent on the number of people an individual interacts with.
Cross referencing the top two employee identifiers with their position within the
organisation (Table 1) we identify a secretary (150) and managing director (122)
as central nodes for both static closeness and betweenness; however, both tem-
poral closeness and betweenness consistently selected employees in trading roles
(053, 075, 107, 147). A secretary and a managing director are certainly important
for information dissemination and central to many communication channels, as de-
tected by static measures. However, instead the top trading executives are exclu-
sively favoured by temporal analysis.
1 The static degree centrality is defined as the number of edges connected to a node i, normalised
by the total possible neighbour nodes (n−1) [57]
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Fig. 1: Ranked distribution of top 50 statically (S) and temporally (T) central nodes.
From top row: Closeness (C), Betweenness (B), and Degree (D). Top 5 node ID’s
listed under each plot.
To show that temporal analysis does not simply uncover nodes with the most
interactions with other people, we also plot the temporal degree (TD) calculated
as the total number of emails sent and received by each node i. Since there is a
low correlation (< 0.4) with temporal closeness and betweenness this shows that
temporal analysis is not dependent on the number of emails sent and received by
each individual.
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ID Role Notes
9 (Unknown)
13 Legal Senior Legal Specialist
17 Manager
48 Executive
53 Trader
54 President Former Head of Trading
67 Vice President Enron Wholesale Services
73 Trader
75 Director of Trading
107 Trader Head of Online Trading
122 Managing Director
127 Chairman & CEO
139 Director
147 Trader
150 Secretary Assistant to Greg Whalley
Table 1: Roles of top centrality nodes.
SB SC SD TB TC TD
SB 1.00 0.57 0.69 0.41 0.24 0.43
SC - 1.00 0.70 0.36 0.22 0.31
SD - - 1.00 0.39 0.28 0.48
TB - - - 1.00 0.43 0.34
TC - - - - 1.00 0.40
TD - - - - - 1.00
Table 2: Kendall-tau correlation coefficients between centralities.
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Fig. 2: Dissemination Process: Dissemination ratio starting from top 2 (left) and top
10 (right) closeness source nodes. Area under curve reported in legend for temporal
(t) and static (s) centrality.
2.4 Effectiveness of Central Nodes on Dynamic Processes
2.4.1 Trace-driven Simulation Setup
To evaluate the role and the centrality of the employees identified by temporal and
static analysis, we consider two dynamic processes. First, we simulate a simple
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Fig. 3: Mediation Process: Dissemination ratio after removing top 2 (left) and top
10 (right) betweenness nodes. Area under curve reported in legend for temporal (t),
static (s) and baseline (b) where no nodes are removed.
information dissemination process over the temporal graph constructed from the
Enron traces. The process is simulated as follows. We select the top N nodes from
the ranking based on temporal closeness centrality. We place an identical message
m into their (infinite) buffers. We refer to any node that has received a copy of this
message as reached. We then replay the contact trace through time and as reached
nodes make contact with an unreached node u, the message is replicated into the
buffer of node u. We assume that messages are transferred instantaneously and only
the first neighbour in a time window can be reached. We then repeat this for static
closeness centrality and plot the dissemination ratio across time for both.
Second, to model the role of individuals as part of an information mediation pro-
cess, we borrow concepts from the more commonly known epidemic immunisation
process where the dissemination ratio of a contagion spreading throughout a static
network is measured before and after certain nodes are immunised against the con-
tagion [3]. This is analogous to measuring the spread of information (the contagion)
before and after important individuals are removed from the network (such as going
on holiday or being discharged) since our conjecture is that removing mediators will
impact the network communication efficiency greatly.
In the trace-driven simulation, instead of a single message spreading within the
organisation, we seed all employees with a different message that needs to be de-
livered to all other employees. This models multiple channels of communication. In
order to derive a baseline performance, we start by calculating the dissemination ra-
tio when no nodes are removed. We then remove the top N individuals identified by
temporal betweenness and rerun the information spreading process. Nodes which
are removed cannot receive or pass on messages. We then repeat the same process
for comparison using static betweenness centrality for the ranking.
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2.4.2 Evaluating Information Dissemination & Mediation
We present plots using N = {2,10} for information dissemination (Figure 2) and
information mediation (Figure 3). As we can see the different pairs of traders iden-
tified by temporal analysis are better than the arbitrary nodes selected by static anal-
ysis for both disseminating information through the organisation and acting as me-
diators between communication channels. In the information dissemination case,
although the final dissemination is the same across the long period of time, the two
traders selected by temporal analysis disseminate information quicker. Only after
increasing to 10 nodes the static analysis presents similar results. In the information
mediation case, the final dissemination ratios for both temporal and static central-
ity nodes slightly decreases by removing the nodes but are comparable. However,
removing the two traders gives an overall more prolonged drop in message dissem-
ination. In the case of the removal of 10 nodes, the individuals identified by means
of the temporal metrics slow the dissemination process further compared to static
ones.
2.5 Summary of the Findings
This study has demonstrated the advantages of using temporal network analysis
over traditional static, aggregated graphs. Although centrality rankings are quantita-
tive measures of node importance, their physical meaning is very much qualitative.
For this reason, we have shown that temporal centrality provides a more accurate
identification of key people in a corporate social network where each persons role
is known. Taking a second perspective, we demonstrate that temporal centrality can
identify nodes which can spread and mediate information, better than static analysis.
This demonstrates the importance of temporal information for applications which
are applied to real networks.
3 Network Robustness
3.1 Overview
The study of real-world communication systems by means of complex network
models has provided insightful results and has vastly expanded our knowledge on
how single entities create connections and how these connections are used for com-
munication or, more generally, interaction [4]. In particular, technological networks
such as the Internet and the World Wide Web have been under scrutiny in terms of
structure and dynamic behavior [28, 23]. More recently, with the widespread adop-
tion of mobile and opportunistic networks, it has become important to develop new
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analytical tools to keep into account network dynamics over time [33, 31] and how
this affects phenomena such as information propagation [15, 10].
At the same time, the problem of understanding whether real systems can sustain
substantial damage and still maintain acceptable performance has been extensively
addressed [2, 5]. Various measures of network robustness have been defined and
investigated for several classes of networks, evaluating how different system can
be more or less resilient against random errors or targeted attacks thanks to their
underlying structural properties [27, 16].
Nonetheless, it is still unclear how to approach the study of robustness of net-
works by taking into account their time-varying nature: by adopting a static repre-
sentation of a temporal network, important features which impact the actual perfor-
mance might be missed. Thus, it becomes important to develop a robustness metric
which takes into account the temporal dimension and gives insights on how a mo-
bile network is affected by damage or change. Particularly, the fact that links are
not always active means that information spreading can be delayed or even stopped
and that relative ordering in time of connection events may affect the creation of
temporal paths in mobile networks.
Our main goal is to design a novel framework for the analysis of robustness
in time-varying networks. We adopt temporal network metrics [53] to quantify net-
work performance and define a measure of robustness against generic network dam-
ages. At first, we study its performance on random network models to understand
its properties; then we apply our method to study a real mobile network, describing
how temporal robustness gives a more accurate evaluation of system resilience than
static approaches.
3.2 A Framework to Evaluate Robustness of Temporal Networks
The study of robustness of complex networks has mainly focused on describing
how a given performance metric of the network is affected when nodes are removed
according to a certain rule. The underlying assumption is that the absence or mal-
functioning of some nodes will cause the removal of their edges and, thus, some
paths will become longer, increasing the distances between the remaining nodes, or
completely disappear, resulting in the loss of connectivity in the whole system. In
this work we will study the problem of defining and analyzing robustness in evolving
networks: as a consequence, we need to use a performance metric which includes the
temporal dimension in its definition. We choose to adopt temporal efficiency as the
performance metric. We then consider random and independent failures for every
node and we evaluate how the system tolerates increasing level of malfunctioning
nodes.
Since a temporal graph is continuously evolving, we can evaluate how temporal
efficiency changes over time by considering a value τ and evaluating EG(t) as the
relative temporal efficiency of the temporal graph in the time window [t− τ, t]. The
effect of τ is to effectively impose an upper bound on the temporal distances, as all
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paths longer than τ simply do not exist. As a consequence, τ should be chosen so
that any communication whose delay is longer than τ itself can be ignored.
Given a temporal graph G, we define a damage D as any structural modification
on it and we define GD as the graph resulting by the effect of the damage D on G.
A damage may be the deactivation of some nodes or the removal of some edges
at a particular time tD. Because of damage D, some temporal shortest paths will
be longer or will not exist any more, thus, we expect that the temporal efficiency
will eventually reach a new steady value EGD ≤ EG. It is important to evaluate the
new value of the temporal efficiency on a new temporal graph which still contains
the deactivated nodes, in order to obtain a decrease in efficiency. Otherwise, we
might obtain a smaller temporal graph which is more efficient than the original
graph, although it has lost much of its structure. Hence, we do not consider highly
dynamic systems where nodes can be constantly added or removed. Instead, we
focus on evaluating the service degradation in a more controlled environment where
only a number of existing nodes could fail.
We define the loss in efficiency ∆E(G,D) caused by the damage D on the tem-
poral graph G as ∆E(G,D) = EG−EGD . Finally, we define the temporal robustness
RG(D) of the temporal graph against the damage D as
RG(D) = 1− ∆E(G,D)EG =
EGD
EG
(1)
This value is normalized between 0 and 1 and it measures the relative loss of effi-
ciency caused by the damage: if the damage does not impact the efficiency of the
graph (EGD = EG) then its robustness is 1, while if the damage destroys the effi-
ciency of the graph (EGD = 0) the robustness drops to 0. Temporal efficiency is a
particularly suitable metric to study temporal network robustness as it denotes both
longer temporal paths and the lack of paths among temporally disconnected nodes
at the same time. Nonetheless, other metrics have been used to assess robustness in
static systems: for instance, there could be scenarios where fast communication with
small delays can be more important than global connectivity, thus other measures
can be adopted. Provided that these measures can be extended to the temporal case,
they can be easily integrated in our framework.
3.3 Robustness of Random Temporal Networks
In this section, we present a numerical analysis of temporal robustness for different
classes of random temporal networks: an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi temporal model, a Markovian
temporal model and mobility-based temporal model.
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3.3.1 Random Temporal Network Models
An Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph with N nodes and parameter p is created by
independently including each possible edge in the graph with probability p and it is
denoted as G(N, p) [20]. We generalize this model to the temporal case by creating
a sequence of T ER random graphs G(N, p) and we denote the resulting temporal
graph as G(N, p,T ).
The temporal ER network model does not provide temporal correlations between
consecutive graphs in the sequence. We thus consider a model where link evolution
is described by a Markov process, thus enabling memory effects in network dynam-
ics. We consider a complete graph G with N nodes. At every discrete timestep t each
link may or may not be present: a temporal graph is created where the existence of
each link evolves according to a 2-state discrete Markov process. We denote with p
the probability that a link present at time t will be removed at time t +1 and with q
the probability that a link which is not present at time t will be added at time t +1.
The steady probability of link presence then is PON =
q
p+q : as a consequence, each
observation of the temporal graph appears as an ER random graph with each edge
present with probability PON .
We also create a random model of a temporal network by using mobility models.
In this case we are introducing topological constraints: a key difference with the
previous temporal models is that each node is not equally likely to connect with all
the other nodes, due to the effect of spatial distance. We consider N = 100 nodes
moving in a square area 1000x1000 meters and we define a communication range r:
at every time step, we create a graph where nodes are connected if their Euclidean
distance is shorter than r. Thus, we change the probability of link presence PON
by varying the communication range. Then, a temporal graph can be defined as the
sequence of graphs extracted at each time step while the nodes move. We investigate
two different mobility models that are implemented using the Universal Mobility
Model Framework [38]: Random Waypoint Model (RWP) and Random Waypoint
Group Model (RWPG). In RWP each node selects uniformly at random a location
towards which it moves with speed uniformly distributed in a fixed range [5,40]
mph. As the node reaches its destination, it waits for a randomly distributed time in
[0,120] seconds and repeats the above steps until the end of the simulation.
In RWPG nodes are divided into two classes: there are M group leaders and
N −M group followers. Every group followers has its own leader so that the N
nodes are divided into equally-sized groups. Each group leader selects a random
target and moves towards it, according to the RWP mobility model. Group members
do not select any target; instead, they follow their group leader according to the
pursuit force [38] which is set to give a group span of 200 meters.
3.3.2 Numerical Evaluation
We numerically evaluate temporal efficiency EG(t) over time, adopting a time win-
dow of τ = 100, for a graph with N = 100 nodes: after an initial phase, the random
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temporal graph reaches an equilibrium state and we compute the steady value of
temporal efficiency. We run each simulation for 2τ steps and we compute the aver-
age value of temporal efficiency over the last τ steps. All results have been averaged
over 100 different runs. We evaluated numerically temporal robustness by deactivat-
ing each node independently with increasing probability PERR. We measure temporal
efficiency before and after the failure, when the network reaches a new equilibrium
state.
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Fig. 4: Temporal robustness RG as a function of probability of error PERR in the ER
random model for different link probability p. The size of the system has no impact
on temporal robustness: furthermore, the system fails smoothly as the probability of
error increases.
As reported in Figure 4, the temporal ER model fails smoothly as we increase
the fraction of removed nodes, without any sudden disruption for any value of PERR.
This is a main difference with respect to what happens in the static case: for a static
ER random graph there may exist a critical value of PERR which causes a breakdown
of the network in several disconnected components [2]. This is not true for temporal
robustness, as new paths can still appear after the damage as the network rearranges
its connections. Time provides more redundancy and, hence, more resilience. More-
over, we also note that temporal robustness does not depend on system size: since it
is normalized with respect to the value of temporal efficiency before the damage, it
depends only on the relative drop in efficiency, not on absolute values.
As shown in Figure 5(a), temporal robustness is affected by probability of error
PERR in the same way as in the temporal ER model: the system fails gradually as
more nodes are removed. However, for intermediate values of PON robustness has
lower values. At the same time, high and low values of PON provide the same robust-
ness, even if the absolute value of temporal efficiency can be very different, thanks
to the normalization of temporal robustness.
In the case of mobility-based temporal networks, reported in Figure 5(b), both
RWP and RWPG exhibit a similar behavior: again, the network loses efficiency in a
smooth way and temporal robustness is not affected by PON in this case as the spatial
characteristics of the network are mainly affecting the resulting robustness.
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Fig. 5: Temporal robustness RG as a function of probability of error PERR and for dif-
ferent values of PON for the Markov-based and for the RWP random model (RWPG
does not deviate from RWP)
3.4 Case Study: Cabspotting
We have seen that temporal networks do not exhibit sudden breakdowns when nodes
are being removed and that various temporal network models exhibit analogies in
their resilience. We now shift our attention to real time-varying networks: our aim
is to understand whether temporal robustness gives us more information than static
robustness in a real case and to investigate whether random models can offer a good
approximation to real networks.
3.4.1 Dataset
This case study is based on Cabspotting, a publicly available dataset of mobility
traces: the Cabspotting project tracked taxi cabs in San Francisco traveling through
all the Bay Area for about two years with the aim of gathering data about city
life [42]. The vehicles were equipped with GPS sensors and every device was peri-
odically updating its position and uploading it to a central server to be stored, along
with the timestamp of the record. Thus, it is possible to reconstruct each taxi’s tra-
jectory over space. For pictorial representations of the dataset, please refer to the
project website [43].
We have selected an area of about 20 km x 20 km around the city of San Fran-
cisco and we have extracted 24 consecutive hours of mobility traces, corresponding
to Wednesday, 21 May 2008. After this, we have generated an artificial contact trace
by defining a communication range of 200 m for the vehicles, which roughly cor-
responds to WiFi connectivity range in similar scenarios [12]: whenever two cars
are within this distance they can communicate to each other. Time granularity is in
seconds, so we have a sequence of 86,400 graphs with 488 nodes and more than
350,000 contacts among them. The average contact duration is about 2 minutes
while the average inter-contact time is more than 2.5 hours.
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Fig. 6: Comparison between temporal robustness RG and static robustness as a func-
tion of probability of error PERR for the Cabspotting dataset (Figure 6(a)). The static
approach overestimates system robustness. Right: Comparison between the tempo-
ral robustness RG of the dataset and random null models with the same number of
nodes N and PON of the Cabspotting temporal network (Figure 6(b)).
3.4.2 Analysis
We study the reaction of the Cabspotting temporal network to random failures and
compare it to our findings on random models. We adopt numerical simulation, but
since the temporal dynamics of this network is not stationary, we can not compare
the temporal efficiency EG before and after a certain error, because the two tem-
poral window will likely have already different properties. Instead, we fail nodes
according to PERR at the very first time step of the temporal sequence of graphs: in
this way, we can compare the average temporal efficiency over all the time for the
original network and for the damaged one. We adopt a value of τ = 3600, which
allows us to consider temporal paths up to 1 hour, even if such longer paths can not
contribute much to temporal efficiency.
The first comparison that we show in Figure 6(a) is between static robustness
and temporal robustness for the Cabspotting temporal network. In this case static
robustness is computed on the static graph obtained by aggregating all the contacts
in the trace and adopting static global efficiency as performance measure. Since the
resulting static graph contains more than 100,000 edges it is clearly an overestima-
tion of the communication properties of the real system, as not all these links are
continuously available over time and some paths can not be used due to temporal or-
dering constraints. Indeed, static robustness appears much larger than the temporal
counterparts: only temporal robustness is able to capture the realistic communica-
tion capabilities of the system and how they are affected by random failures.
Then, we attempt to understand if the various random temporal network mod-
els we have studied can be used to approximate the robustness properties of the real
scenario. For each model, we compute the temporal robustness as a function of PERR
for a network with the same number of nodes N and the same PON measured in the
Cabspotting temporal network (about 0.005), using the same simulation parameters
as in the real scenario. As reported in Figure 6(b), all temporal networks present
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the same trend in network robustness, albeit random models have higher values of
temporal robustness than the real network. Interestingly, the closest match is the
Markov-based temporal model, while the mobility-based models are closer to the
ER model than to the Cabspotting network, even if this is actually a mobility-based
contact network. However, the assumptions used in mobility models require homo-
geneity of space and absolute freedom to move continuously and independently in a
boundless area, while in reality taxis are usually constrained to move on streets and
bridges and they often move together along the same direction or stop together in a
particular place to wait for customers (i.e., airport or stations). The Markov model,
instead, introduces the type of time correlations that appear to better mimic the real
scenario. In fact, the most important aspect that needs to be captured is time order-
ing of events: in random mobility models connections do not follow particular time
patterns, whereas real traces do (rush hour, working hours, human sleeping cycles).
Only temporal robustness can take into account these unique characteristics.
3.5 Summary of the Findings
These two results provide evidence that temporal robustness is a more accurate
measure to be used on mobile networks instead of standard static approaches.
Therefore, when testing protocols and applications to be deployed in mobile net-
works, a temporal study is more meaningful and should not be substituted by a
static approximation.
4 Mobile Malware
4.1 Overview
Smartphones are not only ubiquitous, but also an essential part of life for many peo-
ple who carry such devices through their daily routine. It comes at no surprise then
that recent studies have shown that the mobility of such devices mimic that of their
owners’ schedule [18, 55]. This fact constitutes an opportunity for devising efficient
protocols and applications, but it also represents an increasing security risk: as with
biological viruses that can spread from person to person, mobile phone viruses can
also leverage the same social contact patterns to propagate via short-range wireless
radio such as Bluetooth and WiFi. For example, when security researchers down-
loaded Cabir [1] – the first proof-of-concept piece of mobile malware – for analysis,
they soon discovered the full risk potential of the mobile worm as it broke loose,
replicating from the test device to external mobile phones. This event prompted the
need for specially radio shielded rooms to securely test such malicious code [29].
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Unlike desktop computers mobile malware can spread through both short-range
radio (i.e., Bluetooth and WiFi) and long-range communication (SMS, MMS and
email) [34]. Long-range malicious traffic can potentially be contained by the net-
work operator by scanning every message against a database of known malware
or spam [45], however, short-range propagation might fall under the radar of cen-
tralised service providers: effective schemes to defend against short-range mobile
malware spreading are necessary. In addition, while a global patching of the de-
vices through cellular connectivity is the natural solution and is in theory possible,
in practice, due to associated costs and resource consumption, this is not ideal. For
example, there are potential constraints with respect to the cellular network capacity
and server bandwidth (with respect to the latter, similar issues have also investigated
for software updates distribution in the Internet, see for example [26]).
4.2 Temporal Centrality Metrics for Malware
Being highly correlated with human contacts, understanding how such malware
propagates requires an accurate analysis of the underlying time-varying network
of contacts amongst individuals. State-of-the-art solutions on mobile malware con-
tainment have ignored two important temporal properties: firstly, the time order, fre-
quency and duration of contacts; and secondly, the time of day a malicious message
starts to spread and the delay of a patch [58, 59]. Instead, we argue that the temporal
dimension is of key importance in devising effective solutions to this problem.
With this in mind, the focus of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of two
containment strategies based on targetting key nodes, taking into account these tem-
poral characteristics. We firstly investigate a traditional strategy, inspired by studies
on error and attack tolerance of networks [2], exploiting static and a time-aware
enhanced version of betweenness centrality which provide the best measure of how
nodes that mediate or bridge the most communication flows. According to this strat-
egy the nodes that act as mediators are patched to block the path of a malicious mes-
sage. However, due to temporal clustering and alternative temporal paths, in most
cases, such strategies merely slow the malware and does not stop it. In other words,
a scheme based solely on immunisation of key nodes is not sufficient, instead quick
spreading of the patch is necessary for most networks. We propose a solution based
on local spreading of patches through Bluetooth, i.e., exploiting the same mecha-
nism used by the malware itself. The key issue in this approach is to select the right
nodes as starting points of the patching process. using temporal closeness centrality
which ranks nodes by the speed at which they can disseminate a message to all other
nodes in the network. We show that this strategy can reduce the cellular network re-
source consumption and associated costs, achieving at the same time a complete
containment of the malware in a limited amount of time.
16 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
CAMBRIDGE INFOCOM MIT
N 18 78 100
Duration 10 Days 5 days 280 days
Contacts (avg. per day) 1927 25796 231
Scanning Rate 30 sec 2 min 5 min
Table 3: Experimental Datasets
4.3 Evaluation
4.4 Simulation Setup
To evaluate the time-aware mobile malware containment schemes, three traces of
real mobile device contacts carried by humans are used: Bluetooth traces of re-
searchers at the University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, as part of an emo-
tion sensing experiment [44]; Bluetooth traces of participants at the 2006 INFO-
COM conference [49]; and campus Bluetooth traces of students and staff at MIT
[18]. We shall refer to these as CAMBRIDGE, INFOCOM, MIT, respectively. Ta-
ble 3 describes the characteristics of each set of traces. All three datasets were con-
structed from mobile device co-location where participants were given Bluetooth
enabled mobile devices to carry around. When two devices come into communi-
cation range of the Bluetooth radio, the device logs the colocation with the other
device. For the CAMBRIDGE dataset, all 10 days are used as part of the evaluation.
For the INFOCOM dataset, since devices were not handed out to participants until
late afternoon during the first day, only the last 4 days are used. For the MIT dataset,
we show results for the first two weeks of the Fall semester representing a typical
fortnight of activity.
The top Np devices are chosen according to the calculated temporal between-
ness or temporal closeness centrality ranking from the temporal graph G wt (tp, tmax),
where w is set to the finest window granularity, corresponding to the scanning rate
of the devices in each dataset (for example, 30 second windows for CAMBRIDGE);
and h is set to 1, since higher values of h lead to similar performance of the contain-
ment schemes. The Nm nodes that are initially infected with malicious messages are
chosen uniformly randomly. The results are obtained by averaging over 100 runs
for each Np. The static centralities from the static aggregated graph over the time
interval [tp, tmax] are also calculated for comparison.
Our evaluation is based on the following assumptions: firstly, when a node re-
ceives a patch message, it is immunised for the rest of the simulation (i.e., we assume
that the malware does not mutate over time); secondly, there is always a successful
file transfer between devices (errors in transmission can be taken into considera-
tion in the assessment of the contention scheme without changing significantly the
results of our work, assuming random transmission failures); thirdly, an attacker
chooses nodes at random; and finally, we have no knowledge of which devices are
compromised (otherwise the best scheme is to patch those devices immediately).
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Fig. 7: INFOCOM day 4: Immunising 1 node (top left) & 10 source nodes (top
right). Area under curves shown in the legend. Area (bottom left) and final % in-
fected nodes (bottom right), as we increase the % nodes immunised (x-axis).
4.5 Non-Effectiveness of Betweenness based Patching
Starting from the results of the analysis of the effects time of day has on message
spreading, we now evaluate the best case scenario for the containment scheme based
on patching nodes (without spreading the patch) and we show that this is highly in-
efficient since it requires a very large number of nodes to be patched via the cellular
network to be effective.
Using Day 4 of the INFOCOM trace for this example, a piece of malware is
started at the beginning of the day (tm=12am) and the device(s) are patched at the
same time (tp=12am). This is the best case scenario for two reasons: first, the tem-
poral graph in the morning is characterised by low temporal efficiency since there
are very few contacts, therefore, the malware spreads slowly ; secondly, devices that
are immunised immediately have the best chance of blocking malware spreading
routes.
Figure 7 shows the ratio of compromised devices across time when the top 1 (top
left panel) and top 10 (top right panel) devices are patched after being selected using
betweenness and closeness. As we can see, temporal betweenness initially perform
better than static betweenness and both temporal and static closeness (quantified by
the difference in the area under each curve, shown in the legend). However, by 7am
we observe a steep rise in the number of compromised devices and by the end of
the day, all curves converge to the same point. We also note that in both cases it is
not possible to totally contain the malware, suggesting that more devices need to be
patched. Taking a broader view, Figure 7 shows the area under the curve (bottom
left) and final ratio of nodes infected (bottom right) as we increase the number of
patched devices. Clearly, even when the malware is started at the slowest time
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Fig. 8: CAMBRIDGE [tm=Fri 12am, tp=Sat 12am] delivery rate (y-axis) starting a
mobile worm from single node with best case patching node (left) and worse case
patching node (right) shown. Area under the curve shown in the legend.
of day for communication, we still need to patch 80% of the devices before we can
completely stop the malware from spreading; this can be considered an impractically
high number of devices to patch. Similar high percentages are also required in the
MIT trace with a minimum of 45% patched nodes.
4.6 Effectiveness of Closeness based Patching (Worst Case
Scenario)
Since the betweenness based containment scheme is not effective, we now evaluate
the closeness based spreading scheme with the aim of disseminating a patch mes-
sage throughout the network more quickly than a malicious message. For brevity, we
do not present results on spreading based on temporal betweeness centrality since
it is intuitive that this metric is not designed to quantify the speed of the patching
dissemination process and, for this reason, it leads to poorer results. We start our
analysis by examining a worst case scenario using the CAMBRIDGE dataset: a re-
searcher receives a malicious message on their device in the early hours of Friday
morning (tm=Fri 12am) and the malicious program replicates itself to any devices
it meets during the day. A patch message is started a day later to try and patch all
the compromised devices (tp=Sat 12am). This can be considered as the a worst case
since there are more interactions and hence more opportunity for malware to spread
during the day and the patch is delayed until a day later.
Figure 8 shows the spreading rate for the malicious message versus the best (left)
and worst device (right) to start the patching message. These results were obtained
by running simulations considering every single device as a starting point of the
patching process, and then ranking them based on three performance metrics:
• the area under the curve (AUC), which captures the behaviour of the infection
over time with respect to the number of infected devices2;
• the peak number of compromised devices (Imax);
• the time in days necessary to achieve total malware containment (τ).
2 The AUC is commonly used in epidemiology and medical trials [22].
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Since the AUC captures both the Imax and τ , the best and worst initial devices that
were patched were selected using the AUC. Comparing all three measures, the case
related to the selection of the worst device (right panel) is characterised by double
AUC (2.62 vs. 1.07); a higher peak in compromised devices Imax (68% vs. 60%) and
by the fact that it is not possible to fully contain the malware in a finite time τ (∞
vs. 3.3 days).
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Fig. 9: Performance of temporal, static and naive node selection, across different
malware start times (x-axis), averaged over all patch delays.
4.7 Sensitivity to Malware Start Time
Thus far we have only considered a single malware start time. We now take a
broader view and examine the effects of a malicious message starting at different
times. For each dataset the AUC, Imax and τ are exhaustively calculated for dif-
ferent malware start times at hourly intervals and increasing patch delays starting
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from zero (i.e., patch messages start at the same time as malicious messages) to up
to 2 days. As a baseline, a naive method of randomly selecting patching nodes is
also calculated, averaged over 100 runs. Figure 9 shows for each dataset the perfor-
mance metrics as a function of the malware start time tm, averaged over all patch
delays. In particular, we note that the AUC and the maximum number of infected
nodes Imax tend to follow the temporal efficiency (strictly related to human circa-
dian rhythms); however, the total time of containment (τ) remains stable across all
start times. These results demonstrate that this time-aware containment scheme is an
effective method of quickly containing malware, irrespective of when the malware
started. Now analysing the AUC and Imax, the temporal centrality curve is consis-
tently lower than static and naive methods. Furthermore, static centrality performs
worse than the naive method at some points of time; more specifically:
• For the CAMBRIDGE dataset, during the weekend a static method has a higher
peak number of compromised devices (Imax) than the naive method, which shows
that a static method is not effective at slowing down the malware from spreading.
• For the INFOCOM dataset, again Imax is higher than the naive method, during
days 2 and 4. In addition, the AUC curve for a static method peaks with temporal
efficiency during days 2, 4 and 5: this means that the malware is not contained
effectively in these scenarios. Also, the total containment time (τ) is greater than
that of the naive method during days 3, 4 and 5. This shows that temporal cen-
trality is more consistently effective for identifying the best nodes to start the
patching process, compared to both static and naive methods.
• Finally, for the MIT dataset, the naive method performs extremely poorly (with
high values of UAC, Imax and τ across all malware start times), compared to
either a static or temporal method.
4.8 Summary of the Findings
This study demonstrates that a temporal analysis of mobile device interactions is
better suited to real networks where the topology changes over time. As we have
seen, a traditional strategy of patching high betweenness nodes is not effective when
temporal topological information is taking into account for both the information dis-
semination process and also centrality calculations. Instead, we propose a strategy
that can select the best devices to spread the patch in a competitive fashion, using
the same opportunistic encounters with other devices utilised by the malware itself.
5 Epidemics and Immunisation
A promising application area of the proposed metrics is indeed epidemics modelling
in human networks [37, 30]. Currently, the vast majority of the existing models as-
sume an underlying static network [36, 39]. By considering a static network, the
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temporal order of appearance of the links (i.e., the sequence of the contact oppor-
tunities) is somehow neglected. This fact might have significant implications on the
actual realism of the mathematical model, especially in the case of small popula-
tions. Another specific aspect that might have a strong influence on the resulting
model is the type of mixing patterns [40] that are present in the population.
The problem of modelling the spreading of infection in a time-varying graph and
the definition of vaccination strategies given the information related to the network
and epidemic dynamics (and the correlation between the two) are open and chal-
lenging research areas at the same time. Temporal centrality metrics can be used
for example to prioritise the vaccination of individuals involved in an immunisation
program. Moreover, temporal metrics can be used in general to study the evolution
of a disease over time by providing quantitative measures of the time scale of its
spreading considering the sequence of infected individuals (or geographic areas)
over time.
In the recent years, some works have been focussed on the interplay between
changing topology and the epidemic process taking place over the network. For ex-
ample, in [47] Sarama¨ki and Kaski present a model for studying the spreading of an
infectious influenza on a dynamic small-world network, by analysing the effect of
a dynamic re-wiring process on a Susceptible-Infective-Recovered-style epidemic
model, deriving the equations for the the epidemic threshold and spreading dynam-
ics. In particular, the authors show how the epidemic saturation time scale varies
with the size of the network and the initial conditions. In [35] the authors present
the results of different vaccination strategies by simulating the dynamics of sexual
disease spreading in empirical contact sequences of individuals. More specifically,
the authors analyse the largest outbreak, the average outbreak sizes, and the relative
advantages of the different strategies as a function of the infectivity and the duration
of the infective state.
In general, social encounter networks, a typical class of time-varying networks,
are attracting an increasing attention in the epidemiology community [17]. Re-
searchers have been employing RFID and sensor techniques for extracting contact
traces in order to accurately reconstruct patterns of interactions among individuals,
also with respect to the duration of the contacts (see for example [11, 6, 46]). These
models might also be scaled up to study disease outbreaks in cities [21].
Epidemic models have also been applied to diffusion of ideas, behaviour or
lifestyle choices in social networks [9], for example in order to study the spreading
of obesity [13] or smoking [14]. Another interesting and open area is the charac-
terisation of the spreading of an epidemic and the simultaneous dissemination of
information about it that might modify the behaviour of individuals (i.e., the dy-
namics of the underlying time-varying networks). A work in this direction is [25].
We believe that the application of the proposed metrics to these fields is indeed
very promising and might contribute to increase the accuracy, and therefore, the re-
alism of existing models and to develop new ones allowing researchers to extract
valuable information and insights from them. In particular, the centrality metrics
presented in this chapter and the accompanying one [41] in this book can be used
to identify the key spreaders in order to define effective containment and immunisa-
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tion strategies. For example, vaccination can be based on priorities assigned to the
temporal centralities of the individuals in case of human diseases, whereas, as far as
computer viruses are concerned, white worms used for patching the systems could
be distributed starting from the nodes with the highest temporal closeness centrality.
6 Final Remarks
In this chapter we presented some key applications of temporal metrics to various
domains such as centrality analysis in a social network, robustness and epidemiol-
ogy of computer viruses and diseases. We have shown that temporal graph metrics
are able to provide information about the structure of the time-varying networks
and the dynamics of processes happening over them that is not possible to extract
through the classic static metrics and graph representations. We hope that the case
studies presented in this chapter and the discussions of open problems in the field
might be considered as a starting point and a source of inspiration for future appli-
cations in these and other fields.
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